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Abstract  
This article offers a critical review of recent literature on Chinese legal 
tradition and argues that some subtle but fundamental differences between the 
Western and Chinese legal traditions are highly relevant to our explanation of 
the economic divergence in the modern era. By elucidating the fundamental 
feature of traditional Chinese legal system within the framework of a disciplinary 
mode of administrative justice, this article highlights the contrasting growth 
patterns of legal professions and legal knowledge in China and Western Europe 
that would ultimately affect property rights, contract enforcement and ultimately 
long-term growth trajectories. The paper concludes with some preliminary 
analysis on the inter-linkages between the historical evolution of political 
institution and legal regimes. 
 
 
Western law – its unique features of legal formalism and rule of law 
– as argued by Max Webster has laid the foundation of Western capitalism 
and the eventual of the West (Trubeck 1972).  Crucial to the Western 
legal system is Weber’s distinction between formal and substantive justice.  
Under formal justice, legal adjudication and process for all individual legal 
disputes are bound by a set of generalised and well-specified rules and 
procedures. Substantive justice, on the other hand, seeks the optimal 
realisation of maximal justice and equity in each individual case, often with 
                                                  
1 I want to thank comments from and discussion with John Drobak, Tirthankar Roy, Billy 
So, Oliver Volckart, Patrick Wallis, Jan Luiten van Zanden.   
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due consideration to comprehensive factors, whether legal, moral, political 
or otherwise. Formal justice tends to produce legal outcomes that are 
predictable and calculable, even though such outcomes may often clash 
with the substantive postulates of religious, ethical or political expediency 
in any individual case. Weber believed that formal justice is unique to the 
European legal system, with its highly differentiated, specialized and 
autonomous professional legal class, independent from the political 
authority.  Legal rules were consciously fashioned and rulemaking was 
relatively free of direct interference from religious influences and other 
sources of traditional values. Formal justice reduces the dependency of 
the individual upon the grace and power of the authorities, thus rendering 
it often repugnant to authoritarian powers and demagoguery. Above all, 
the rule of law born out of the Western legal tradition supplied what Weber 
termed as calculability and predictability, elements essential for explaining 
the rise of Western capitalism and its absence in other civilizations.2 
The Weberian synthesis permeated the thinking of generation of 
sinologists on the Chinese legal tradition.  John King Fairbank remarked 
that “the concept of law is one of the glories of Western civilization, but in 
Chinese, attitude toward all laws has been a despised term for more than 
two thousand years. This is because the legalist concept of law fell far 
short of the Roman. Whereas Western law has been conceived of as a 
human embodiment of some higher order of God or nature, the law of the 
legalists (in China) represented only the ruler’s fiat. China developed little 
                                                  
2 Weber (1978), vol.II, p.812. Unger (1976) and Trubek (1972), p.721.  
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or no civil law to protect the citizen; law remained largely administrative 
and penal, something the people attempted to avoid as much as possible” 
(1960, p.84). 
These sentiments on the relative “backwardness” of Chinese legal 
tradition have entered into summary form in a recent book by Chinese 
legal scholar, Zhang Zhongqiu.  The Chinese legal tradition, according to 
him, originated in tribal wars, was collectivist, dominated by public law, 
oriented towards ethical value, singular and closed, encapsulated in 
official legal codes, founded on the rule by man, and aimed for the ideal of 
no litigation, as contrasted with Western law which originated in clan 
conflicts, was individualistic, dominated by private law, oriented towards 
religious value, plural and open, expounded by jurisprudence, founded on 
the rule of law and aimed for justice (2006).  These broad-brush 
characterizations, while useful to certain degrees, border on simplistic 
stereotypes of different legal cultures which have become the target of 
criticism from recent waves of revisionist scholarships. Contrary to the 
traditional Weberian synthesis, these recent works on Chinese legal 
tradition have argued that the Qing imperial legal system, long regarded 
as the epitome of arbitrary justice, was in fact far more rule-bound and 
predicable in their upholding of private property rights and enforcement of 
private contracts that previously recognized (see Philip Huang 1996, Zelin, 
Ocko and Gardella 2004). Interestingly, this is in line with another separate 
but influential argument advanced by Kenneth Pomeranz in his influential 
book, “Great Divergence” that views the property rights or the freedom to 
contract in traditional China as no less secure or flexible than in Western 
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Europe. The implication of these lines of argument that the roots of 
economic divergence between China and Western Europe in the modern 
era needs to be sought in areas other than ideological and institutional 
factors.3      
This article offers a critical review of recent literature on Chinese 
legal tradition and argues that while the recent revisionist literature make 
significant contribution to a lively and timely re-examination of traditional 
Chinese legal system, it overlooks some subtle but fundamental 
differences between the Western and Chinese legal traditions that are 
crucial to the origin of the economic divergence in the modern era.  By 
elucidating the fundamental feature of traditional Chinese legal system 
within the framework of a disciplinary mode of administrative justice, this 
article highlights the contrasting growth patterns of legal professions and 
legal knowledge in China and Western Europe that would ultimately affect 
property rights, contract enforcement and ultimately long-term growth 
trajectories. The paper ends with some preliminary analysis on the 
inter-linkages between the historical evolution of political institution and 
legal regimes. 
The rest of the article is divided into three sections followed by a 
conclusion.  The first section reviews the major feature and the related 
debate on the nature of traditional Chinese legal system. The second 
section offers a comparative analysis on legal traditions between China 
and Western Europe.   The third section offers some preliminary analysis 
                                                  
3 For a summary of the California school, see Ma 2004b. See Pomeranz (2000) on the 
flexibility of traditional Chinese factor markets. See Philip Huang, Zelin et al for these 
revisionist studies on traditional Chinese legal system 
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on the linkage between political institutions and legal regimes in China and 
Europe.  
 
 
I. Law and Legal System in Traditional China: Issues and 
Debates 
We start our review of the Chinese legal tradition with Thomas 
Stephens’s useful classification of traditional Chinese legal regime as 
“disciplinary” versus “adjudicative” or “legal” in the West.  A “disciplinary” 
legal regime is akin to a military tribunal system whose overriding interest 
is the sanctioning of deviant behaviour to ensure group solidarity and 
social order at large (p.6).  We can trace this “disciplinary” element of 
traditional Chinese law to etymology.  The Chinese word for law, “fa,” (法) 
also means “punishment” (刑) (Liang 2002, p. 36, Su, p. 6).  In fact, 
pre-modern Chinese legal text makes no distinction between punishment 
and military conquest (兵刑不分), a contrast to the Latin etymology of “law”, 
“jus” which specifically denotes rights (Liang, 2002, p. 37-38).   
In traditional Chinese law (as in Rome law), the emperor is the 
source of law.  Traditional Chinese legal apparatus had been an integral 
part of the administrative system with bureaucracy within the hierarchy – 
from the county level to the emperor – acting as the arbiter in criminal 
cases. But there is a system of checks to ensure consistency.  The 
Chinese penal code was highly elaborate and systematic.  The 
compilation of China’s first legal code dated to 629 in the Tang dynasty 
(revised and completed in 737), only a hundred years later than the 
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Justinian code (drafted in 529 and promulgated in 533). As pointed out by 
Japanese scholar, Shuzuo Shiga, almost all the court rulings on criminal 
cases were required to cite specific official penal codes and statures as 
support.  Legal decisions on criminal cases, depending on the severity of 
punishments, would need to be reviewed through the administrative 
hierarchy with capital punishment reviewed and approved by the emperor 
himself (Shiga et al p.9).  Officials at the lower level would face 
punishment if their rulings were found to be mistaken after review.    
Despite the elaboration and sophistication of this legal system, this 
is in the end a bureaucratic law designed for the officials to meter out 
punishments proportionate to the extent of criminal violations for the 
purpose of social control.  The official legal codes were structurally 
organized along the six ministerial divisions under the imperial 
bureaucracy: government, revenue, ceremony, justice, military and works 
(Liang, 1996, p.128-9).  “More than half of the provisions of the Qing 
code, as pointed out by William Jones, are devoted to the regulation of 
‘the official activities of government officials’” (cited in Ocko and Gilmartin, 
p.60). The meticulous and sophisticated juridical review process is carried 
out top-down within the administrative hierarchy.  
In the case that the emperor made decisions and rulings outside the 
purview of extant legal statutes or contravened existing codes, these 
decisions became new laws or sub-statutes to be used as legal basis for 
future cases (Shiga et al, pp.11-12).  In fact, as emphasized by Shiga and 
Terada, as the formal legal codes changed little over the dynasties, the 
emperor’s legal decisions on individual cases formed the single most 
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important dynamic changes to China’s formal legal system (Shiga et al pp. 
120-121).  Although there are no formal legal or constitutional constraints 
on the imperial power (except the informal ones such as the much talked 
about “mandate of heaven”), the emperors recognize the value of 
consistency, fairness and balance in the legal system (Ocko and Gilmartin, 
p.61).  So a “disciplinary” mode of justice may not necessarily lead to 
complete arbitrariness.  
As the fundamentally penal nature of Chinese legal codes render it 
un-amenable to dispute resolution of a commercial and civil nature, this 
led to the long-held view of a complete absence of Chinese civil and 
commercial law. However, new research reveals that the county 
magistrates, the lowest level bureaucrats, handled and ruled on a vast 
amount of legal disputes of civil and commercial nature that did not entail 
any corporal punishment. Is there an implicit or a functional civil and 
commercial law in traditional China?4    
Shiga argues these county-level trials were something more akin to 
a process of ‘didactic conciliation’, a term he borrowed from the studies by 
Western scholars on the Tokugawa legal system in Japan. The decisions 
of the magistrates were not legal ‘adjudications’ as in the Western legal 
order.  The magistrate’s ruling was effective and a legal case was 
considered as resolved or terminated only to the point that both litigants 
consented to the settlement and made no further attempts for appeals. 
Although not common, Shiga did point to cases where a legal dispute 
                                                  
4 For the extent of average people utilising the county level civil trial system, see 
Susumu Fuma’s article in Shiga et al. and also Huang (1996). 
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dragged on indefinitely when one of the litigating parties reneged – 
sometime repeatedly - and thus refused to fulfil his or her original 
commitment to the settlement. Thus, this kind of ruling lacked the kind of 
binding and terminal force as the legal adjudication in the modern sense     
Shiga was also interested in the legal basis of magistrate’s rulings 
and found that although invoking general ethical, social or legal norms, 
they rarely relied on or cited any specific codes, customs or precedents. In 
accordance with its intermediation characteristics, the magistrate’s ruling 
showed less concern for the adoption of a reasonably uniform and 
consistent standard than the resolution of each individual case with full 
consideration to its own merits.  Shiga made a general case that the 
magistrates often resorted to a combination of “situation, reason and law” 
(情，理，法) as tools of persuasion or threat where it becomes necessary 
(see Shiga et al 1998, Shiga 1996, 2002).  
This can best be illustrated by a specific case used by Shiga:     
A widow of over 70-years old, Mrs. Gao, living in 19th century 
Shandong province pawned land to her junior uncle and his two sons at 
45,000 cash.  Later, Mrs. Gao wanted her cousins to buy and take over 
the land by paying an additional 50,000 cash. The cousins refused and the 
disputes were taken to the court.   
The magistrate started his ruling by declaring that the blood 
relations are far more important than money matters and the welfare of the 
old widow needs to be looked after by her extended family. As there is a 
local custom that usually sets the pawning price of land at half of the sale 
value of the land, the widow should ask for an additional 45,000 cash 
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rather than 50,000 from the cousins. The magistrate further advised that 
the uncle and his two sons could share in their payment to the widow. The 
dispute seemed to be resolved with both parties agreeing to the 
magistrate’s settlement (Shiga et al, p. 56). 
The specific case shows clearly that the magistrate’s ruling goes far 
beyond narrow legal spheres. In fact, he was much more interested in 
influencing the outcome – rather than the rules - of the game by bringing 
about what he viewed a socially ethical and harmonious outcome at the 
expense of the original terms of the agreement.  His ruling relied on the 
power of persuasion more than legal basis.  Shiga’s particular interest in 
this case comes from the fact this is one of the few that specifically cited a 
local custom. But clearly, as Shiga points out, the customs cited here was 
nowhere implicated as the legal basis of his ruling or a binding social rule. 
In fact, Shiga pointed out other cases where local customs were simply 
ignored or even condemned (Shiga et all, pp. 57-59).  
The flexibility with which magistrates made their rulings is also 
confirmed by Mio Kishimoto’s careful case study of land sales (2003).  In 
many regions, sellers of land often requested post-sales compensation 
from their buyers especially following the rise of land prices after sale. This 
practise led to widespread abuse with sellers requesting compensation at 
amounts and duration far beyond the customary rule or the original terms 
of the agreement. Resorting to reasons of sickness, old age, hunger, bad 
harvest, and sometimes blatant extortion, some sellers turn this 
compensation request into annual affair (often around the Chinese New 
Year). In fact, as summarized by Kishimoto, there is a systematic tendency 
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for magistrates’ rule to lean towards requesting the relatively wealthy land 
buyers to compensate the poor in spite of the original agreement. The fact 
that that law or legal rulings were often mobilized for redistributive purpose 
can be substantiated by the statement from one of China’s legendary 
iconoclastic late-Ming bureaucrat海瑞 (Hairei): “When in doubt during a 
litigation, my ruling would rather err on the side of the poor than the rich, 
on the side of the weak than the powerful”5  
These features have led scholars to question the fundamental 
meaning of courts and contracts in traditional China. Terada argued that 
the magistrate’s court more often served as a forum to renegotiate a 
settlement to replace the old one based on the changed conditions.  
“Contract” in traditional China was merely a written proof of a mutual 
agreement which may or may not have power binding the future (Terada 
2003, p.95).  Others echoed that “…regardless of subject matter, 
contracts and “documents of understanding” were more social than legal 
in nature because they were rooted in and protected by the social 
relationship of the parties;” or alternatively put, “the surest guarantee of 
one’s rights seems to have been their acknowledgement by the local 
community” (by Myron Cohn and Ann Osborne respectively, cited in Ocko 
and Gilmartin, p. 74).  Ironically, the importance of social relation behind 
contracts partly explains the motivation for litigation at the Magistrates’ 
court.  People filed complaints to enforce a contract and settle a debt and 
                                                  
5 Cited in Li Qin, 2005, p. 47. Liang Ziping also argued that the magistrate would not 
hesitate to issue rulings that could result in the alteration or simplification of the original 
agreements between the litigant parties if this would help “quiet both parties” Liang 1996, 
pp.134-140. 
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so on, but getting a case accepted for hearing also made use of courts to 
intimidate, coerce, and to turn the balance of social power in favour of the 
litigants within the social networks. Parties to private agreements utilized 
formal litigation as a means to gain advantages in a power relationship 
over private agreements, a process more aptly termed as “litinegotiation” 
(Ocko and Gilmartin, p. 71).  As emphasized by Terada, disputes over 
properties and contracts were in the end resolved or regulated through the 
interplay of social norms, power, compromise and rational recognition of 
long-term benefit and cost.6  
This largely Weberian interpretation of traditional Chinese legal 
system met vigorous challenge from China specialists, Philip Huang.  
Huang’s interpretation of Qing archival legal cases of civil disputes led him 
to conclude that the rulings of magistrates were far from being arbitrary but 
rather, rooted in formal legal codes and seemed legally binding for most of 
the cases. However, as pointed out in a series of rebuttals by Shiga and 
Terada, Huang’s somewhat contentious finding hinges on a very specific 
methodology that he adopted.  Although there was no evidence to show 
that the original rulings by the magistrates cited any legal statues or local 
customs as their legal basis, Huang matched the contents of the ruling 
                                                  
6 See Shiga et al, pp.191-279. One such case in point is recorded by a recent study of 
the commercial disputes in the highly commercialized Huzhou region of Anhui province 
in Ming and Qing.  According to Han Xouyao, a serious and protracted land dispute 
between two large lineages in the area broke out and lasted across generation for a 
total of 128 years (from 1423 to 1551), and saw numerous trials and rulings by the 
county and prefecture courts and incidences of violent conflicts.  In spite of the official 
ruling from the prefecture court, the disputes only ended with the drafting of a “truce” 
agreement signed by the two lineages and witnessed by middle men and village elder 
(pp. 93-117). 
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with the what he deemed as the relevant codes in the formal Qing legal 
penal code (Shiga 1996 and Terada 1995).  
While there is much to be desired about Huang’s methodology of 
inserting legal codes ex post to back up legal rulings made by magistrates 
several centuries earlier, the idea that magistrates ruled by some general 
moral and legal concepts and principles embedded in formal codes does 
merit attention.7  In fact, Huang’s criticism of Shiga thus framed actually 
takes him close to the original position of Shiga who explicitly stated that 
magistrate’s ruling appealed to a wide set of moral and ethical values most 
of which could be embedded in formal penal codes. If so, are the legal 
traditions indeed as divergent as Weber may have made out to be? After 
all, Western legal rules also partly formed through the codification of local 
customs and norms which may be reflective of general ethical and moral 
values.  In particular, the English Common law system exemplifies such a 
process of law-finding and law-making based on the incorporation of 
principles embedded in customs and norms.  
 
 
II. Convergent or Divergent Legal Traditions? 
To appreciate the often subtle yet fundamental differences between 
the Chinese and Western legal traditions, we need to incorporate a much 
more systematic and historic perspective.  It is useful for us to start with 
Harold Berman’s following characterization of the fundamental features of 
                                                  
7 Zelin’s argument on strong property rights and contract enforcement is also based on 
the fact that Qing’s formal criminal code contains statutes relevant for civil and 
commercial matters. see Zelin 2004, p.19-23.  
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Western legal tradition which can be traced back to the Papal Revolution 
of the Middle Ages, the starting point of the political separation between 
church and state and political fragmentation:   
• There is a sharp distinction between legal institutions and other 
types of institutions. Custom, in the sense of habitual patterns of 
behaviour, is distinguished from customary law, in the sense of 
customary norms of behaviour that are legally binding; 
• The administration of legal institution is entrusted to a special corps 
of people, who engage in legal activities on a professional basis; 
• The legal professionals are trained in a discrete body of higher 
learning identified as legal learning, with its own professional 
literature and in its own professional schools.  
• There is a separate legal science, or a meta-law. Law includes not 
only legal institutions, legal commands, legal decisions and the like 
but also what legal scholars say about them; 
• Law has a capacity to grow and the growth of law has an internal 
logic; 
• The historicity of law is linked with the concept of its supremacy over 
the political authorities. The rulers (or the law-makers) are bound by 
it; 
• Legal pluralism – the co-existence and competition within the same 
community of diverse jurisdictions and diverse legal systems – is 
most distinctive characteristics of the Western legal tradition (Harold 
Berman 1983, p. 7-8). 
 
 13
Although formal law especially in commercial affairs evolved slowly 
in the West partly because commercial disputes tended to be highly 
specialized and formal legal litigation and enforcement extremely costly, 
there occurred an evolution that led to the rise of an increasingly unified 
consistent body of laws based on the compilation of variously urban laws, 
guilds laws, in particular the well-known merchant law (lex mercatorie) 
centred in major trading centres under autonomous local government or 
independent city-states.  The modern civil law in many ways formed 
through the amalgamation and standardization of traditional customary 
laws and commercial practices in different territories of jurisdiction. Major 
intellectual and political revolutions such as the Reformation and the 
Enlightenment movement, particularly the rise of modern nation-states 
became a major force that propelled the formation of modern Civil Law.8  
The most illustrative case of this bottom-up process of legal growth 
is the historical development of the English legal system as a system 
distinct from the Continental civil law regime. As noted by Maitland, what 
allowed the English case-law system to develop, was not just the 
Parliament or the jury system - as the former was widespread in Europe 
and the latter originated in France - but the rise of a professional legal 
guild of lawyers and judges organized under the system of inns of court 
and chancery and their related training methods based on the study of 
legal case reports (Li 2003, p.20). Originating in the Medieval era, the inns 
of court grew from a training institution to become the equivalent of a law 
                                                  
8 See Berman 1983 for detailed description of this evolutionary process. See Grief 2006, 
chapter 10 for the evolution of impartial law in Medieval Europe. 
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school which by the Tudor times would be termed as the third University of 
England (outside Cambridge and Oxford) (J.H.Baker 2002, p. 161). Within 
this legal profession nurtured an independent jurisprudence that fostered 
the rise of an English legal tradition based on the commentaries and 
analysis of legal cases.  
More importantly, with the Royal judiciary appointments being 
selected from among the most prominent members of this legal profession, 
the seeds of judiciary independent from political control had been sown. It 
was through the growing independence of an English judiciary, largely 
resolved through the political wrangling of the seventeenth century that 
laid the foundation for what was to become the hallmark of an English 
constitutional tradition rooted in the rule of law (J.H. Baker 2002, pp. 166-8, 
Li, chapter 6).  The rise of an autonomous legal profession allowed the 
development of legal rule and procedure based a professional standard 
relatively free from extra-legal influences and thus ensured a sufficient 
degree of consistency and predictability in legal outcomes based on the 
case-law methods even before the establishment of the strict doctrine of 
binding precedents by the nineteenth century (Duxbury, chapter 2).  Or 
as Weber put it in the characteristically Weberian jargon: “while not 
rational this (common) law was calculable, and it made extensive 
contractual autonomy possible” (Weber 1951, p. 102). 
The evolution of the Chinese legal regime presents a sharp contrast 
to the overtime professionalization in the West. Not only did the entire 
legal system continue to be a part of the administrative organ of the state, 
but also, as Shiga aptly put it, all parties involved in dispute resolution in 
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traditional China, ranging from magistrates, third-party witnesses to 
guarantors and contracting parties remained distinctively “layman” like 
(Shiga 2002, chapters 4 and 5). The in-depth research by Chiu 
Pengsheng (2004) offers a vivid portrayal of a magistrate’s court in action 
during Ming and Qing China.  The court session was open to the public, 
often thronged with various onlookers sometimes unrelated to any parties 
of the litigation. With an official qualification based on his success in a 
state examination system inculcated in Confucian classics, and appointed 
under a three-year country-wide rotating system of bureaucratic posting, 
the magistrate was often ill-prepared both in legal expertise and in local 
knowledge of the county he was serving. As a magistrate could face 
demotion or even physical punishment when his legal decisions were 
reviewed to be mistaken by the upper level administrative hierarchy or if 
the discontent litigants appealed to his superior (an extremely costly 
process) against his rulings, the effectiveness of his ruling to satisfy the 
review from the above and resolve disputes between litigants became 
important.9   
As a result, most magistrates came to rely heavily on the legal 
assistance of the so-called 幕友, the private legal secretaries hired at their 
“personal” expenses.  These legal secretaries were not allowed to be 
physically present at the court and thus operated from behind the scene 
based entirely on the written documentation. The magistrates’ 
dependence on their personal legal secretaries also induced the rise of a 
                                                  
9 See Ocko 1988 for the appeals procedure. For the very high costs of litigation at 
magistrate’s court, see Deng Jianpeng, chapter 2. 
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profession equivalent to what would have been lawyers in the West, the 
so-called “litigation masters or pettifoggers”(讼师), who used their legal 
expertise to assist the litigating parties in legal proceedings. While these 
factors pushed for professionalization in the West, they took a different 
turn in the Chinese political context of a dominant state bureaucracy.  As 
their legal assistance tended to encourage legal suits which clearly 
clashed with the state objective of social stability, litigation master as a 
profession had long been stigmatized with various pejorative labels, 
branded as illegal and subject to penal punishment. The memoir of Wang 
Zhuhui, an eminent legal secretary with a long and successful career 
serving various magistrates during the late 18th century, told with pride 
how he handled these litigation pettifoggers after catching them: they 
would be physically tied to a column in the magistrate’ court and set on 
public display to witness the litigation which they helped instigate; they 
would then be caned and made to repent in public the next day before 
being finally released. Indeed, a secret guidebook for the professional 
litigation masters specifically advised them not to turn up at the court to 
avoid being picked out from among the crowd (Chiu 2004, pp. 55-6). 
Despite the official ban, litigation pettifogging flourished as an 
underground profession that engaged in drafting legal suits as well as 
conniving with court runners or clerks to influence the legal outcome. 
The rise of litigation pettifogging also induced a lively body of 
illegally published and circulated technical guidebooks for the profession 
under the general title of “The Secret Handbook of the Litigation Masters” 
(讼师密本).  If we add these to various privately published handbooks for 
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the legal secretaries (such as Wang Zhuhui) and bureaucrats as well as 
numerous well-known private compilation of legal cases tried and ruled in 
the court, we have a substantial body of legal literature in traditional China 
(Zheng 2003, p.497-8).  There is an official Chinese version of 
“jurisprudence” (Lu-Xue 律学) which almost exclusively focused on 
technical issues on the application, interpretation and exposition of official 
legal punishment. In fact, Shiga pointed out the etymology of the word 律 
(Lu) refer to musical notes, which implies that the Chinese “Lu-Xue” is all 
about finding the appropriate scale of punishments for crimes (Shiga et al, 
p.16).  Clearly, these legal publications in China differed significantly from 
the Western jurisprudence developed through the formal 
institutionalization of an independent and autonomous legal profession 
and legal education. For that matter, Shiga and others also questioned the 
appropriateness of transliterating the term “Lu-Xue” as “jurisprudence.” 
(Zhang Zhongqiu chapter 6, Shiga et al, p.13-15). 
What is missing in the state-dominated legal regime is the 
institutional capacity to generate bottom-up process of law-finding and 
law-making. Indeed as pointed out by Zheng Qin, the published 
compilation of legal cases often led to the use of “rulings by analogy” (类比) 
by officials in their legal trial in order to achieve some form of consistency 
in their legal decisions, something of a precursor to a doctrine of 
precedent. However, in China, except for those rulings approved by the 
Imperial government, the practise of ruling by analogy was often 
discouraged for fear that officials may deviate too far from the formal 
codes or imperial instructions (Zheng, p.501-2). 
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Similarly, as Jerome Bourgon pointed out that the direct 
transliteration of modern Western legal terms on traditional Chinese terms 
could sometime lead to misconception of the fundamental gap between 
the two legal traditions. Bourgon pointed out that there is no equivalent 
legal term in Chinese that corresponds exactly to the Western terminology 
for “customs.” The direct transliteration of “custom” for the Chinese word 
“xiguan” (习惯) could be misleading.  “Customs” in the West was not 
merely a sociological phenomenon but also a judicial artefact, asserted by 
witnesses, or appreciated by the jury, often with a clear territorial 
delimitation. In contrast, “customs” in China, according to Shiga and 
Bourgon, identifies only loose, mostly unwritten social practices without 
territorial delineation.  They might at times serve as a reference but 
almost never formed the specific legal basis upon which the county 
magistrates made their decisions or the litigants made their claims. They 
do not “harden” into law.  
This gulf between formal legal rules and private customs has been 
widely noted. Deng Jianpeng for example pointed to the clear expressions 
of private property rights in various forms could be found in the tens of 
thousands of private land sale contracts in traditional China.  But there 
were few attempts of any systematic institutionalization or codification of 
these rights in the state legal system whose overriding interest in private 
land transactions had remained in the securing of land taxes.10  The 
                                                  
10 See Deng Jianpeng, chapter 1 for various examples how property rights in land were 
often identified with the payment of state land taxes. Bourgon 2006 makes similar points.  
For some recent studies that reveal the highly sophisticated and rational features of 
private customary practices in land contracts in traditional China, see Long Denggao. 
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other illuminating example is the case of copy rights in traditional C
Contrary to the contemporary image of an absent tradition in intellectual 
property rights, Deng argued that the early invention and diffusion of 
printing had led to rising demand and repeated attempts by the publishers 
to assert and defend property rights of their printed editions, yet none of 
these attempts received any clear backing from the state or 
institutionalization in the formal legal system. Meanwhile, the state’s own 
heavy handed regulation of publication and copy rights were largely 
motivated by political censorship or the protection of state sponsored 
publications of Confucian classics (Deng, chapter 3).   
hina. 
So, in short, we need to distinguish a legal regime that has the 
capacity to transform disparate customs and norms into generalizable and 
positive legal rules or precedents as in the West from one that entrusted 
and embedded similar moral and ethical principles in the hearts and minds 
of individual bureaucrats or mediators as in the case of traditional China. 
As internalized and intuitive reasoning did not enter into a sphere of public 
knowledge subject to debate, reflection, analysis or synthesis, they did not 
possess one of the most important dynamic element that Berman 
emphasized for European law: its historicity, or its capacity to grow with its 
own internal logic. This may be the distinguishing hallmark between the 
rule of law and rule of man, a point that could be lost in the type of ex-post 
“matching exercise” conducted among recent Chinese legal revisionist 
scholarship. 
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III. Political Institutions, Legal Regimes and Public Knowledge 
To understand the roots of this divergence in legal traditions, we 
may need to go beyond mere intellectual sphere and venture into the 
larger historical context of political structures in a centralized empire in 
China versus political fragmentation and independent competing power 
groups within each polity in Western Europe.11 The peculiar political 
structure that had fragmented Western European political landscape since 
the Medieval era not only made possible a regime of inter-state 
competition, but also created autonomous space within a single polity for 
independent corporate bodies that embodied commercial or propertied 
interest.  As argued by Greif (2008), the existence of elites with 
administrative powers in Europe constituted an essential pre-condition for 
the rise of constitutionalism. In England, the ability of parliamentarians to 
mobilize administrative and military counterweight against the King 
created space for the growth of these independent corporate bodies such 
as the legal community. Indeed, the legal community sided with the 
parliamentarians to control the jurisdiction of the King’s prerogative courts 
in the seventeenth century (Berman 1983, pp. 214-215). Even as the 
supreme ruler of the land, King James I was famously admonished by his 
own royal chief justice, Edward Coke, that that the power of adjudicating 
legal cases did not lie in his hands, but in those of professionally trained 
judges guided by the laws and customs of England (ibid p. 464).    
                                                  
11 Shiga attributed the non-adjudictive legal regime in traditional China to the absence 
of “adversary” culture in traditional China as could be seen in ancient Greece. See 
Shiga 2002, p.368. This cultural explanation seems hard to square with the motto held 
by victory-driven litigation masters in Ming and Qing China: “to win one hundred legal 
suits out of one hundred” (Chiu, 2003). 
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In this regard, the precocious rise of a unitary political rule in 
imperial China offers a mirror case study.  While early elaboration and 
“rationalization” of a bureaucratic law that served well the aim of political 
control and social stability, the political dominance of a unitary imperial rule 
founded on the elimination of any independent contending elites and 
supported by a highly centralized bureaucratic machine could have 
possibly stifled the growth of a civil society which were essential for the 
existence of an independent legal profession. Ultimately, a legal system 
embedded within this type of political structure remained dependent upon 
a power structure.12  Often higher level officials and gentries with higher 
degrees were simply beyond the laws of the magistrate’s court or courts of 
any bureaucracy at the lower hierarchy. Chinese law, as pointed out in 
Ch’u T’ung-tsu’s classic study, is fundamentally hierarchical with the senior 
members in a society (whether defined by bureaucratic status, age or 
gender) entitled to lesser punishment to the same crime than the junior 
ones. 
In this system, properties or property rights were only derivative to 
social and political status of individual members within the power hierarchy.  
The concentration of wealth in the distinctively bureaucratic class of 
Chinese gentry and the massive investment of Chinese merchant lineage 
in their offspring’ preparation for China’s Civil Service Examination are all 
testimony to the predominance of political posts over property 
                                                  
12 For a narrative on the political structure in traditional China and non-alignment of the 
imperial rulers and property class，see Ma 2009 and also Deng. 
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ownership.13  In the West, the political institution of representation, 
defined and endowed the property owners and wealthy elites with political 
power. In China, the channel of power went in the opposite direction: from 
political power emanated the property. Hence, Deng Jianpeng presented a 
case of a fundamental dilemma of property rights in China: the absence of 
formal legal protection sent property owners to seek custody under 
political power, yet property defined and acquired through political power 
lacked legality (Deng, p. 69).  
This dilemma may not be paradoxical in the context of substantive 
justice as delineated by Weber. The lack of hard rules and objective 
standards, while posing risks for property rights and contracts, gives the 
authority discretionary power to influence the outcome of certain actions 
ex-post in an intended direction.  The lack of distinction between legal 
and extra-legal, or what Liang Ziping termed as “ethicalization of law” and 
“legalization of ethics”, gives the rulers a free hand to intervene where they 
saw fit in almost any aspect of Chinese society, public or private, criminal 
or civil (Liang 2002, chapters 10 and 11).  Meanwhile, given the resource 
constraint of a traditional empire, it also gives the rulers the discretion to 
keep their hands free from areas where no direct state interest was at 
stake.  Indeed, the states’ long-standing policies on civil and commercial 
disputes were to discourage formal litigation and encourage self-resolution. 
In many cases, the state found it expedient to “farm out” coercive violence 
                                                  
13 See Chang Chung-li for the enormous wealth accumulated by Chinese gentry 
bureaucrats. For widespread practise of buying official titles by wealthy families see 
Deng, p.68-69. 
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or disciplinary duties to non-official elites as a means of social control.14  
In turn the state would impose a system of collective responsibility over 
the leaders of these groups and communities.  Judged in this light, 
substantive justice is very cost-effective and distinctly rational. 
It is important to note that this disciplinary mode of justice coupled with 
community sanctioning mechanism supported a high degree of market 
exchange and commercialization as we observed throughout Chinese history. 
Furthermore, even in the West, relationship and personal based mechanism 
of contract enforcement remained important and functional in the presence 
or “shadow” of formal justice.  In fact, as pointed out by Greif and others, 
informal mechanism probably functioned well or even better than a formal 
legal system (which is expensive to set up) when the extent of exchange and 
the scale of operations remain small and local (Greif 2006 and John Li).  It 
was when the scale, the extent and frequency of exchange began to stretch 
across space and time that the costs and risks tend to grow exponentially.  
An independent formal legal system with replicable standard and 
enforceable rule is a powerful aid to the large scale of impersonal exchange 
and complicated commercial and industrial organizations that had 
characterized modern capitalism.  Indeed, Thomas Stephen’s 
characterization of Chinese legal system as a disciplinary mode of justice 
was constructed in the context of the treaty port of Shanghai where Western 
and traditional Chinese legal system came head to head.  It was the rise of 
                                                  
14 Shiga, for example, documented in detail the sanctioning of the power of capital 
punishment to lineage leaders over their own members subject to official review (2002, 
chapter 2). For the power of corporeal punishment in villages and guilds, see Han 2004, 
chapter 2 and Weber 1951, chapters 4. 
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exterritorial rights and a Western legal system that underpinned the rise of 
large-scale Western and Chinese enterprises to support the phenomenal 
rise of modern Shanghai in the early 20th century (see Ma 2008).      
There is a dynamic advantage of a formal legal system associated 
with the growth of public knowledge in the form of jurisprudence. Indeed, 
as others have argued that the logic of legal growth through the derivation 
of transcendental rules from the study of practical legal cases and private 
customs based on jurisprudential reasoning in many ways paralleled some 
methodological features that underpinned early modern scientific 
revolution. Just as the growth of an autonomous science community had 
been essential to the rise of the scientific revolution, the rise and growth of 
an independent legal and academic community running from the 
apprenticeship based training legal guild to the higher institution of 
university law school also underpinned the basis of European legal 
revolutions.15  
In this context, Joel Mokyr’s recent resurrection of the role of the 
scientific revolution and industrial enlightenment to the industrial revolution 
in England is highly relevant.  The significance of the industrial revolution 
lies in its cumulative and sustainable effect on growth which is 
distinguished from earlier growth spurts that usually peter out after a 
period.  What changed in 18th century Europe is what he termed an 
expanded epistemic base resultant from the foundation of scientific 
                                                  
15 See again J.H. Baker (2002) for the case of English legal community and Berman 
(2002, pp. 265-9) for an argument on the methodological linkage between legal 
jurisprudence and scientific thought in the seventeenth century. Toby Huff (2003) 
represents a major proponent on the linkage between legal institution and scientific 
revolution in the West. 
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revolution and industrial enlightenment. Key to this argument is that 
knowledge has the characteristics of a public good and acts as a fixed 
input that could generate scale economies. Furthermore, through a 
feedback loop between what he termed prescriptive and propositional 
knowledge, knowledge itself generates a learning process that creates 
new knowledge (Mokyr 2002). 
While much has already been written in the sphere of science 
technology, future research should also explore the mechanism that ties 
together the role of political institution, legal regime and jurisprudence (as 
public knowledge) to long-term economic growth.16 This thesis might also 
be highly relevant for explaining long-term economic and institutional 
trajectory in traditional China. The process of social and collective learning 
– a process which might be the key to cumulative long-term institutional 
change – would either falter or truncate when legal knowledge was driven 
to secret circulation or legal community turned underground as in 
traditional China. The lack or paucity of new ideas theories on political and 
legal regimes might well explain the frequent change of political regimes 
or dynasties marked by violent rebellions and revolutions throughout 
Chinese history often degenerated into mere modified replications of the 
old order that the rebellion had come to replace.    
 
 
                                                  
16 For a narrative on the feedback loop that runs from the ideas of John Locke, the 
French enlightenment thinkers and the American federalists and the political events of 
Glorious Revolution, American Independence and French revolution, see Berman 2003, 
pp.13-16. 
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III Conclusion 
Our debate on the “Great Divergence” should integrate the 
divergent traditions in legal traditions and institutions between China and 
the West in the early modern period.  To the extent that those institutional 
and epistemological elements that underpinned the legal revolution in the 
11th and 12th century – the separation of Church and state, the emergence 
of an independent territorial jurisdiction, the pursuit of transcendental, 
objective and rectifiable standards – were also relevant, as argued by 
Toby Huff, for the rise of a scientific revolution in early modern Europe, one 
needs to take seriously the linkage between legal institutions and the 
origins of the industrial revolution.   
It is important to note that the relative efficiency hypothesis of 
divergent legal traditions is a positive not a normative statement.  Nor is it 
a verdict against the relative merits of comparative civilizations or 
multiculturalism.  The Western experience shows that a private social 
order not only constitutes the evolutionary basis for public institutions but 
also continues to play an indispensable role even in modern economies.  
In China, the inherited cultural and institutional endowments are essential 
to the making of economic miracles. The long experience of social 
networks, communities and informal institutions accumulated in China 
helped reduce transaction costs and supplied trust to enable economic 
growth to occur in the 19th and 20th centuries even before the clarification 
and reform of formal rules and institutions.  The traditional preference for 
flexibility over fixed rules may have helped Chinese reform in the early 
1980s to successfully evade much of the ideological rigidities with little 
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social tension.  This may have contributed to the spontaneous 
emergence of institutional innovations of a highly experimental and often 
ad-hoc nature ranging from the household responsibility system, the 
township and village enterprise, to the overseas Chinese networks of FDI 
to China.   
These developments have led to reinterpretation of Chinese 
economic history which has taken to task the long-term stagnation thesis 
and contend for a case of substantial progress in industrial and agricultural 
technologies, expansion of regional trade, growth in urbanization, and 
perhaps even demographic transition for early modern China.  While both 
the post-WWII East Asian miracle and post 1980s China miracle provided 
the important motivation for the revisionist impulse, it is often too easy to 
forget how much political and institutional transformations had transpired 
in the last one and half century to enable modern economic growth as 
achieved today. What probably distinguished East Asia from the rest of the 
developing world today, or what Max Weber had failed to anticipate, is her 
learning capacity to absorb not only Western technology but also formal 
institutions - from legal system to state-building and to monetary regimes. 
One of the pillars of the Meiji reform in Japan was the adaptive 
introduction of Western legal institutions ranging from the Constitution to 
commercial law, to modern accounting and joint stock corporations.  In 
China, legal reform was delayed until after the turn of the 20th century 
when the first set of civil and commercial codes were being compiled with 
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the aid of Japanese legal specialists.17 But with the collapse of the Qing 
empire and the nation thrown into civil disorder after 1911, the 
implementation of legal and institutional reform was severely curtailed. As 
I argued elsewhere, much of the economic divergence in today’s East Asia 
could be traced to the differential patterns of political and institutional 
response to the Western challenge in the mid-19th century (2004a). 
Clearly, the administrative nature of Chinese traditional justice 
continues to exert a dominant influence on contemporary Chinese legal 
apparatus under the garb of a Western Civil Law regime.  The fact that 
economic growth occurred largely in the absence of rule of law during the 
last two decades should not be viewed as a vindication of its irrelevance.  
On the contrary, Chinese economic reform borrowed and used 
ready-made institutions founded on those legal concepts that had taken 
centuries to evolve in Western Europe. Eventually to sustain the growth 
beyond the stage of institutional adaptation, a transition to the rule of law, 
one form or another, may become imperative for China.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
17 It was also in the 1920s that a government sponsored massive survey of various 
private customs on private property rights and contracts were conducted with the aim of 
deriving formal legal rules from private customs. See Liang 1996.   
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